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FORM V. SUBSTANCE: THE SUPREME COURT RETREATS
INTO ITS FORMALISTIC SHELL IN OKLAHOMA TAX
COMMISSION V. JEFFERSON LINES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States."1 However, it says nothing about the protection of inter-
state commerce absent any affirmative action by Congress. The
Supreme Court has consistently recognized implicit in the lan-
guage of the Commerce Clause "a further, negative command,
known as the dormant Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain
state taxation even when Congress has failed to legislate on the
subject."2 In finding that states may constitutionally tax the
local portion of interstate business transactions, the Court has
held that "[it was not the purpose of the Commerce Clause to
relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just
share of state tax burden even though it increases the cost of
doing business."' This concept is known as apportionment.
Apportionment, as it relates to taxation, is the assignment of
the income of a business engaged in interstate commerce to
specific states for income taxation.4 Apportionment issues often
center around "specific formulas for slicing a taxable pie"
among the several states where a taxpayer's activities receive
certain benefits.5 It is not necessary that the taxpayer take
advantage of the benefits. As long as they are available, the
state is justified in burdening the local portion of the transac-
tion.
From 1988 through 1990, Jefferson Lines, Inc., ("Jefferson") a
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1995);
see Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992).
3. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1339.
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Minnesota corporation, provided bus services in Oklahoma.6
Oklahoma taxes the sale of transportation for hire, including
both intrastate and interstate bus travel.7 Under the Oklahoma
statute, the buyers of the taxable services pay the taxes, which
must be collected and then remitted to the state by the retail-
er.' Jefferson opposed the state tax and failed to remit to the
Oklahoma Tax Commission nearly $47,000 in sales taxes, repre-
senting the tax on the portion of the travel outside of Oklaho-
ma. On October 27, 1989, Jefferson filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy protection, and the Oklahoma Tax Commission subse-
quently filed a proof of claims in bankruptcy court for the un-
collected taxes on this interstate travel.9 Jefferson objected to
the claims arguing that the Oklahoma tax is unfairly appor-
tioned and unduly burdens interstate commerce by allowing
Oklahoma to tax the full purchase price of interstate bus tick-
ets "even though some of that value [is derived] from bus travel
through other states.""° The bankruptcy court agreed as did
the district court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit." The Eighth Circuit found that the United States Su-
preme Court's 1948 decision in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v.
Mealey'2 was controlling and held that the Oklahoma tax at
issue was indistinguishable from the unapportioned gross re-
ceipts tax struck down in Central Greyhound.3
The Eighth Circuit stated that the tax failed the apportion-
6. Id. at 1335.
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1354(1)(C) (Supp. 1988). The statute provides in rele-
vant part,
There is hereby levied upon all sales . . . an excise tax of four percent
(4%) or the gross receipts or gross proceeds of each sale of the follow-
ing . . . (C) Transportation for hire to persons by common carriers, in-
cluding railroads both steam and electric, motor transportation companies,
taxicab companies, pullman car companies, airlines and other means of
transportation for hire.
Id.
As a result of recent amendments, the statute currently charges an excise tax of four
and one-half percent (4 %); OKLA- STAT. tit. 68, § 1354(1)(C) (Supp. 1996).
8. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1334.
9. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d 90 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Oklaho-
ma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995).
10. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1335.
11. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d 90 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. Oklaho-
ma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995).
12. 334 U.S. 653 (198).
13. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d at 93.
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ment prong of the test in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady
and thus it was externally inconsistent. 4
The question before the Supreme Court was whether an
Oklahoma state tax on interstate bus travel was properly ap-
portioned such "that [Oklahoma] taxes only its fair share of the
interstate transaction" while not subjecting the taxpayer to
multiple taxation for the same discrete sales event. 5 The
Court also had to square its analysis under Complete Auto with
its 1948 decision in Central Greyhound, a case very similar to
the instant case.
The current test of a state tax's validity under the Commerce
Clause is the four-prong test announced in 1977 by the Su-
preme Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.6 The
Court, in considering the practical effect of a state tax, will
sustain a tax against Commerce Clause challenge when the tax:
1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to the
taxing state; 2) is fairly apportioned; 3) does not discriminate
against interstate commerce; and 4) is fairly related to the
services provided by the taxing state.'
This casenote examines the Court's characterization in Okla-
homa Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. of the sales tax
at issue and the effect its decision will have on interstate com-
merce considering the risk of multiple taxation. Part II discuss-
es the historical evolution of the Supreme Court's dormant
Commerce Clause adjudication since 1938, with special empha-
sis given to the cases upon which the Supreme Court and the
Eighth Circuit relied in reaching their conclusions. Part III
introduces the facts and procedural history of Oklahoma Tax
Commission and explains the reasoning of the Court and the
dissent. Part IV analyzes the Court's conclusion that the unap-
portioned tax neither discriminates against interstate commerce
nor creates the risk of multiple taxation. Finally Part V consid-
ers the future ramifications of the holding in light of the risk of
multiple state taxation.
14. Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)). For a
discussion of Internal Consistency, see infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
15. Id. at 1338 (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1989)).
16. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
17. 430 U.S. at 279.
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II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE REVISITED: THE
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE SINCE 1938
A. Introduction
Modern day emphasis on the practical considerations of a
state tax can trace its roots to 1938 with the Supreme Court's
decision in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue." An ex-
tensive consideration of Commerce Clause adjudication prior to
1938 is beyond the scope of this casenote. However, a discus-
sion of several Commerce Clause cases since 1938 will prove
helpful in understanding both the present test for the validity
of a state tax and the Court's analysis in Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission. In considering the discussion of the cases that follow,
bear in mind that the validity of any terminology must be test-
ed by asking: "Does it convey any meaning to those who must
use it? Does it show its reason on its face?"'9 The 1938 case,
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue ° marked a shift by
the Court to a consideration of the practical effects of a tax
instead of the usual application of a formal distinction or label
in upholding or rejecting a tax.2'
18. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
19. Allison Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 211, 216 (1947) (citing KN. Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful
in Law, 9 U. CHi. L. REv. 224, 250 (1942) ("Only the rule which shows its reason on
its face has ground to claim maximum chance of continuing effectiveness . .
20. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
21. In its earliest stages, the Court viewed interstate commerce as wholly im-
mune from state taxation in any form. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.
115 S. Ct. 1331, 1336 (1995) (citing Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648
(1888)). The Court later narrowed this rule and distinguished between direct burdens
on interstate commerce, which were prohibited, and indirect burdens which were not.
See e.g., Sanford v. Poe, 69 F. 546 (6th Cir. 1895), alTd sub. nom. Adams Express
Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194, 220 (1897). This view gave way to a more
formal approach under which the Court would invalidate a state tax that was mea-
sured by the gross receipts from interstate commerce. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.
v. State Bd. of Taxes and Assessments, 280 U.S. 338 (1930). This position would
evolve into a more practical consideration of the effects of the tax on interstate com-
merce in 1938 with the Court's decision in Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue,
303 U.S. 250 (1938). The test became one of proper apportionment of interstate rev-
enues between the distinct local operation of the business and the portion derived
from interstate transactions, with a focus on the risk for multiple taxation. Id.
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1. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue22
In Western Live Stock, New Mexico imposed a gross receipts
tax on Western Live Stock, a company which prepared, edited
and published a monthly livestock trade journal." The journal
had an interstate circulation and the company received a por-
tion of its revenue from out of state advertisers.24 Western
Live Stock argued that the New Mexico tax offended the Com-
merce Clause because it was measured by gross receipts,25
which were augmented by revenues from the interstate circula-
tion of the journal.26 In considering the Court's prior doctrine
that gross receipts from interstate commerce may not be made
the measure of a state tax, Justice Stone wrote that "[p]ractical
rather than logical distinctions must be sought."" "It was not
the purpose of the Commerce Clause to relieve those engaged
in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden
even though it increases the cost of doing the business."28 This
clearly implied that a state may constitutionally tax a company
conducting interstate business but the Court nevertheless con-
tinued the struggle to define the limits of interstate commerce
for determining a taxpayer's "just share of the tax burden."29
In a marked retreat from the Court's pre-1938 reliance on
formalistic distinctions, Justice Stone acknowledged the "double
demand that interstate business should pay its way, and that
22. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
23. Id. at 252.
24. Id
25. Id.
There is hereby levied, and shall be collected by the Tax Commission,
privilege taxes, measured by the amount or volume of business done,
against the persons, on account of their business activities, engaging, or
continuing, within the State of New Mexico, in any business as herein
defined, and in the amounts determined by the application of rates
against gross receipts, as follows: . .. I-At an amount equal to 2 per
cent of the gross receipts of any person engaging or continuing in any of
the following businesses: . . . Publication of newspapers and magazines
(but the gross receipts of the business of publishing newspapers or maga-
zines shall include only the amounts received for advertising space).
Id. at n.1 (citing 1934 N.M. Laws ch. 7, § 201) (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 254.
27. Id. at 259.
28. Id. at 254.
29. Id.
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at the same time it shall not be burdened by [multiple taxa-
tion]."3 The Court further explained that the state may consti-
tutionally tax the privilege of carrying on local business if the
portion taxed is separate and distinct from the portion earned
from interstate commerce.31 Applying this standard, the Court
found that the New Mexico tax both in form and in substance,
properly taxed that portion of the local business that was sepa-
rable from interstate commerce." This concept of proper appor-
tionment has arguably become the dominant consideration of all
latter day dormant Commerce Clause adjudication. It seemed as
if the formalistic distinctions relied on prior to Western Live
Stock had been filed away once and for all.
2. Freeman v. Hewit33
In Freeman v. Hewit, however, the Court once again em-
braced the formal distinction between indirect and direct taxa-
tion.34 In Freeman, Indiana imposed a tax upon the entire
gross income of residents and domiciliaries and sought to apply
this tax to income generated from the sale in New York of
securities owned by an Indiana-based trust.35 Justice Frank-
furter, writing for five members of the Court, announced a
blanket prohibition against any state taxation imposed directly
on an interstate transaction.36 A direct tax on interstate sales,
even if fairly apportioned and nondiscriminatory, was held to be
unconstitutional per se. 7
Justice Rutledge, in a lengthy concurring opinion argued for
a more pragmatic approach asserting that the true test for
30. Id. at 258. The very next year the Court applied this prohibition against
multiple taxation and invalidated an unapportioned gross receipts tax. See Gwin,
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 304 U.S. 434, 439 (1939).
31. Western Live Stock, 303 U.S. at 258.
32. Id. at 261.
33. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
34. Id. at 256. The Court invalidated an Indiana gross receipts tax because that
particular application would impose a direct tax on interstate sales. Id.
35. Id. at 250-51.
36. Id. at 276-77.
37. Id. at 255; see also Dunham, supra note 19, at 215 ("If the tax is a 'direct
tax upon' interstate commerce or a 'levy upon the very process of commerce' or a
'direct tax on interstate sales,' the Commerce Clause strikes down the tax however
remote or insubstantial the interference with commerce.").
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determining the validity of a tax is whether the tax has the
"consequences for interstate trade intended to be outlawed by
the Commerce Clause." 8 Justice Rutledge would find a state
tax unconstitutional in three situations: 1) if the activity taxed
lacks a sufficient nexus to the taxing state;39 2) if the tax dis-
criminates against interstate commerce;4" or 3) if the tax
would subject the activity to multiple taxation.4' In making
use of the "expressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference' with
commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to de-
scribe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by which it
is reached."42 The Court would continue this emphasis on la-
belling, reborn in Freeman, while considering the validity of a
Connecticut tax on the privilege of doing interstate business
within the state.43
3. Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor
The prohibition against state taxation of the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce was reaffirmed in Spector
Motor Service v. O'Connor.45 Spector was a Missouri corpora-
tion engaged exclusively in interstate trucking with some of its
interstate shipments either originating or terminating in Con-
necticut.4" Connecticut imposed on every corporation "a tax or
excise upon its franchise for the privilege of carrying on or
doing business within the state," measured by apportioned net
income.' 7 The state court of final jurisdiction explained the tax
to the United States Supreme Court to help determine the "all-
important operating incidence of the tax," which would be used
38. Freeman, 329 U.S. at 267.
39. Id. at 271.
40. Id. at 274.
41. Id. at 276-77.
42. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1926) (Stone, J., dissenting) over-
ruled by California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
43. Ms. Dunham concluded her examination of Freeman v. Hewit with the correct
premonition that since the Court provided little guidance by its decision in Freeman
that the Court "will doubtless have an early opportunity to re-examine its [conclu-
sions]." Dunham, supra note 19, at 226. Just one year later, the Court would decide
Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey during the 1948 term, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
44. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 603.
47. Id. at 603-04 n.1 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 418(c) (Supp. 1935)).
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to answer this constitutional question.48 The Court, in a 6-3
decision written by Justice Burton, recognized that "where a
taxpayer is engaged both in intrastate and interstate commerce,
a state may tax the privilege of carrying on intrastate business
and, within reasonable limits, may compute the amount of the
charge by applying the tax rate to a fair proportion of the
taxpayer's business done within the state, including both inter-
state and intrastate [portions]."49 The Court went on to hold
that the tax on the privilege of carrying on intrastate business
was unconstitutional when applied to what is "exclusively inter-
state" commerce.5 °
The dissent by Justice Clark5 ' chided the majority for de-
claring the statute unconstitutional "simply because the State
has verbally characterized it as a levy on the privilege of doing
business within its borders."52 Despite Justice Burton's decla-
ration that "ilt is not a matter of labels,"53 the Court attached
constitutional significance to the difference between a tax on
business that was "exclusively interstate in character" and a
constitutionally permissible tax on a taxpayer engaged in both
interstate and intrastate business.54 Thus, the Spector rule
emerged: a state tax on the "privilege of doing business" is per
se unconstitutional when it is applied to interstate commerce.55
This rule, however, would be expressly overruled twenty-six
years later by the Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady.
56
48. Id. at 605-06. The Supreme Court of Errors for the State of Connecticut said
that the tax is then a tax or excise upon the franchise of corporations for the privi-
lege of carrying on or doing business in the state with net earnings used only to
determine the amount due from each corporation. Id. at 606 (citing Spector Motor
Services v. Walsh, 61 A.2d 89, 98-99 (Conn. 1948)).
49. Id. at 609-10.
50. Id. at 610.
51. Justice Clark was joined in his dissent by Justices Black and Douglas.
52. Id. at 611 (Clark, J. dissenting).
53. Id. at 608.
54. Id. at 609-10.
55. Id. at 609.
56. 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977). "There is no economic consequence that follows
necessarily from the use of the particular words, 'privilege of doing business,' and a
focus on that formalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a
forbidden effect." Id. at 288.
1598
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0
B. Realism Overcomes Formalism: Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady
The Court's answer to this perplexing maze of inconsistent
and often competing decisions was its decision in Complete Auto
highlighted by its enunciation of a four part test to apply in
future dormant Commerce Clause cases involving state taxation
of interstate commerce. In Complete Auto, Mississippi imposed a
franchise tax on a motor carrier company engaged in transport-
ing cars manufactured outside the state." Complete Auto
Transit challenged the tax on the ground that it was a tax on
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. 8 In an opin-
ion authored by Justice Blackmun, the Court rejected Complete
Auto Transit's argument that a tax on the privilege of engaging
in an activity in a state may not be applied to an activity that
is part of interstate commerce. 9 The Court dispatched this
argument because that position ignored the practical implica-
tions of the tax." The Court noted that if Mississippi had
characterized the tax as one on either net income or the going
concern value of the business then it would be upheld.6 Jus-
tice Blackmun correctly refused to commit the Court to making
constitutional distinctions based on labels while ignoring the
economic consequences of the tax. 2 The Court required a prac-
tical analysis of whether a tax affecting interstate commerce is
"fairly apportioned."63 The central purpose of apportionment is
57. Id. at 275-76. The Mississippi statute states:
There is hereby levied and assessed and shall be collected, privilege taxes
for the privilege of engaging or continuing in business or doing business
within this state to be determined by the application of rates against
gross proceeds of sales or gross income or values, as the case may be, as
provided in the following sections.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-65-13 (1972).
58. Id. at 278.
59. Id. at 288-89.
60. Id. at 278.
61. Id. at 288.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 279, quoted in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609,
617 (1981)). In Commonwealth Edison Co., the Court made it clear that gross receipts
taxes affecting interstate commerce were subject to the same "consistent and rational
method of inquiry" it had applied to other taxes which focused on "the practical effect
of a challenged tax." 453 U.S. at 615-16 (emphasis added).
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to ensure that each state taxes only its fair share of an inter-
state transaction.64
In considering the practical effect, the Court established a
four part test to determine whether a state tax offends the
Commerce Clause. The Court will sustain the tax when it: (1)
is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus within the
taxing state; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3) does not discriminate
against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly related to the
services provided by the taxing state.6" The Court has further
refined its definition of apportionment under the second prong
of the Complete Auto test to include a consideration of "internal
consistency" and "external consistency."66 A discussion of these
concepts is included in the introduction to Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission discussed later in this casenote. 7
C. Stare decisis and Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey
In Oklahoma Tax Commission, the lower courts relied on the
Supreme Court's 1948 decision in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc.
v. Mealey.61 In Central Greyhound, New York levied an unap-
portioned gross receipts tax on a New York-based bus company
which applied to all revenues, even though a large percentage
was attributable to bus services rendered outside New York.69
The Supreme Court found the tax invalid because it was not
apportioned between interstate and intrastate revenues." Jus-
tice Frankfurter, writing for five members of the Court, con-
cluded that this unapportioned tax unfairly burdened interstate
64. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1989).
65. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 430 U.S. at 279.
66. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987);
Armco v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax
Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
67. See infra part III.A.
68. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
69. Id. at 660. New York imposed a tax on gross receipts for the entire mileage
of the transportation services sold. That is, an unapportioned state tax on the gross
receipts from ticket sales representing 57.47% of the miles in New York and also on
the 42.53% outside of New York. Id. at 662.
70. "The vice of [the New York tax] is that it lays 'a direct burden upon every
transaction in [interstate] commerce by withholding, for the use of the state, a part
of every dollar received in such transactions.'" Id. at 663 (Crew Levick Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 297 (1917)).
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commerce because revenue could be taxed both by states which
gave protection and services to the taxpayer, as well as by a
state that did not.'
Justice Frankfurter reasoned that if the New York tax was
upheld, Central Greyhound would be subject to multiple taxa-
tion because Pennsylvania and New Jersey would also be enti-
tled to tax the gross receipts of Central Greyhound. 2 These
states would be entitled to this tax because 43% of the total
mileage was within their borders and, during the time spent
travelling within those borders, each state provided benefits
and services to the bus line. 3 "[A]n unapportioned gross re-
ceipts tax makes interstate transportation bear more than 'a
fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection
it enjoys."'7 4 A state may only constitutionally tax the part of
the receipts which is proportionate to the mileage travelled
within the state. The Court held that the tax may be fairly
apportioned on the basis of mileage travelled within the state
and thus held the construction of the New York Tax Law un-
constitutional. 5
Justice Murphy wrote the dissenting opinion 6 challenging
the majority's position that bus travel through neighboring
states and ending in the same state is actually interstate com-
merce." The dissent avoided the apportionment issue by rea-
71. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. at 662. In the instant case, New
York provided services to Greyhound for just over half of its revenues while other
states provided services for the remainder. Of these services, highways and police
protection while travelling within the state are particularly important to interstate
bus travel. These are significant services rendered by the state justifying the collec-
tion of a tax on the revenue derived from use of these services. "Neither [Pennsylva-
nia and New Jersey's] interests nor their responsibilities are evaporated by the verbal
device of attributing the entire transportation to New York." Id. at 660.
72. Id. at 662.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 663 (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946)).
75. Id. It is interesting to note that N.Y. TAX LAW § 186-a(2)(a) (Consol. 1978)
specifically excludes 'omnibuses having a seating capacity of more than seven per-
sons. . . ." Presumably, this specific clause was added in response to the Court's 1948
decision in order to avoid the apportionment of interstate mileage travelled by com-
mercial bus companies.
76. Justices Black and Douglas joined in Justice Murphy's dissenting opinion.
77. 334 U.S. at 664 (Murphy, J., dissenting). "[Clommerce among the states is a
practical rather than a technical legal conception.") Id. at 667 (construing Sunft & Co.
v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). Thus, he reasoned that a consideration of
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soning that the transaction was inappropriately labelled by the
majority as interstate commerce despite the fact that 42.53% of
the transportation occurs outside New York.7" Justice Murphy
concluded that since the bus transportation was merely local
commerce, New York was entitled to tax the total gross re-
ceipts.79 The Court would later abandon the dissent's formalis-
tic rationale in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady," but the
Court refused to discard this line of reasoning completely and
continued to answer Commerce Clause questions based on for-
mal distinctions. The Court's rationale underlying apportion-
ment of interstate transactions is no less appropriate today
then it was in 1948. However, the nature of some transactions
may preclude apportionment as the Court found in Goldberg v.
Sweet.8
D. Apportionment may be Administratively Impracticable:
Goldberg v. Sweet
Illinois imposed an excise tax of five percent of the unappor-
tioned gross charge on the origination or receipt in Illinois of
interstate telecommunications." Thus, Illinois levied a tax on
the gross charge of interstate telecommunications originating or
terminating in Illinois and charged to an Illinois service ad-
dress, regardless of where the telephone call was billed or
paid.83 The Tax Act provides a tax credit to any taxpayer who
proves they have paid a tax in another state on the same tele-
phone call which Illinois is seeking to tax.'
The Illinois trial court found that the tax violated the Com-
merce Clause because it created a "real risk of multiple taxa-
the practical effects of a transaction precluded "indiscriminate application of the inter-
state label simply because state lines are crossed." Id.
78. Id. at 671.
79. Id.
80. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
81. 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, para. 2004 (1985), quoted in Goldberg v. Johnson,
512 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ill. 1987), affd sub nom. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252
(1989).
83. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 256 (1989) (citing ILL REV. STAT. ch. 120,
para. 2002, §§ 2(a)-(b) (1985)).
84. Id.
1602
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tion... [since] at least two taxing jurisdictions levy a tax
similar to the instant tax... ,,s" The state supreme court re-
versed, finding that the tax did not offend the Commerce
Clause and satisfied the four-prong Complete Auto test. 6 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, again applying the
Complete Auto test, holding that the tax was externally consis-
tent, thus satisfying the apportionment prong." The Court fur-
ther held that the tax did not discriminate against interstate
commerce and was fairly related to the services which the state
provided to taxpayers. 8 Writing for the Court, Justice Mar-
shall acknowledged a slight risk of multiple taxation when the
service address and the billing location of a taxpayer are in
different states.8 9 The Court reasoned, however, that this
slight risk was insufficient to invalidate the tax and was ade-
quately remedied by the credit provision in the Tax Act.9"
The majority concluded that requiring an apportionment
formula based on the mileage that the calls travelled in Illinois
would be administratively impracticable.9 Justice Marshall
distinguished Goldberg from other apportionment cases, most
notably from Central Greyhound, as dealing with the movement
of "large physical objects over identifiable routes" where appor-
tionment is practicable.2 Justice Marshall implied that, but
for the administrative and technological burdens associated
with modern telecommunications, apportionment would be ap-
propriate where a state attempts to tax the in-state portion of
the telecommunication."
Justices Stevens and O'Connor each filed separate opinions
concurring in the judgment but refusing to join the majority
position that a state may discriminate against its own residents
85. Goldberg v. Johnson, 512 N.E.2d 1262, 1267 (Ill. 1987), affd sub nom.
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
86. Id. at 1268. The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that although an unappor-
tioned tax is constitutionally suspect because of the risk of multiple taxation, the
credit provisions of the tax act adequately prevented this danger. Id. at 1267.
87. 488 U.S. at 252-53.
88. Id. at 267.
89. Id. at 263 & n.13.
90. Id. at 263-64; see, e.g., id. at 263 n.13.
91. Id. at 265.
92. Id. at 264; see, e.g., Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653,
663 (1948).
93. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 264-65.
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by placing a heavier tax on those who engage in interstate
commerce than those who merely engage in local commerce.94
Justice Scalia, also concurring in the judgment, maintained his
position that only state taxes which facially discriminate
against interstate commerce violate the dormant Commerce
Clause.95
In recent years, the Court has upheld every state tax that
has faced an apportionment challenge." During this same time
period, the Court has struck down state taxes that facially
discriminated against out-of-state businesses presumably be-
cause the Court, in adopting a more realist approach, believed
there was a substantive difference between a sales tax and a
use or excise tax.97 This analysis is heightened by the presence
of Justices Scalia, a true formalist, and Thomas, both of whom
consistently hold that only facially discriminatory statutes are
unconstitutional.98 Thus, they would be inclined to find the
Oklahoma tax constitutional because the Oklahoma statute does
not facially discriminate against interstate commerce.
The Court, in its ongoing struggle between formalism and
realism, therefore had to choose between the two competing
theories in deciding Oklahoma Tax Commission. If it followed
the formalist approach propounded by Justice Scalia, then the
Court would certainly hold the tax constitutional. If, however, it
found the tax substantively indistinguishable from the tax held
unconstitutional in Central Greyhound,99 then the Commerce
Clause challenge would be sustained. This represents the real-
ist approach, which includes a consideration of the economic
effect of the tax while acknowledging that proper apportionment
94. Id. at 268-70. Specifically, they refused to join the majority's statement that
"[i]t is not a purpose of the Commerce Clause to protect state residents from their
own state taxes." Id. at 266.
95. Id. at 271 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96. See Michael C. Wagner, Note, Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines:
Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxing Power, 14 J.L. & CoM. 277, 290 (Spring
1995).
97. Id. at 293.
98. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331,
1346 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment joined by Thomas, J.); Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 271 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Barclays
Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd. 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2287 (1994) (Scalia, J. concurring).
99. 334 U.S. 653 (1948); see supra part II.D.
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is administratively feasible when applied to the movement of
'large physical objects over identifiable routes.""0
III. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION V. JEFFERSON LINEs, INC.
A. Introduction
Before examining the decisions of the lower court and the
Supreme Court in this case, a discussion of the refinements of
the Complete Auto test may prove helpful. The Court in sub-
sequent decisions added two concepts to its consideration of
apportionment issues. The Court must also consider both the
internal consistency and external consistency of the tax.
1. Internal Consistency
The Court originally defined internal consistency as the taxa-
tion formula such that, "if applied equally by every jurisdiction,
it would result in no more than all of the 'unitary business'
income being taxed."'0 ' The Court redefined this internal con-
sistency test in Goldberg v. Sweet holding that "to be internally
consistent, a tax must be structured so that if every State were
to impose an identical tax, no multiple taxation would re-
sult."'0 2 Internal consistency does not preclude multiple states
from taxing the same transaction so long as the portion of the
income taxed by each state is not taxed by another state. That
is, internal consistency exists where an identical tax in every
other state would "add no burden to interstate commerce that
intrastate commerce would not also bear."' 3
This test creates a much stricter standard than that an-
nounced in Complete Auto Transit.' A failure of internal con-
100. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 264 (1989); see, e.g., Central Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
101. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
102. 488 U.S. 252, 261 (1989). Here, the Court held that Illinois' excise tax on
interstate telephone calls was internally consistent.
103. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1338 (1995).
This test asks nothing about the economic reality reflected by the tax, but simply
looks to the structure of the tax at issue.
104. Amy M. Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On Its Last
Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1221 (1994).
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sistency shows as a matter of law that a state tax unduly bur-
dens interstate commerce and thus is in violation of the Com-
merce Clause.105 Any other rule would mean that a state's
particular tax laws would depend on "the shifting complexities
of the tax codes of forty-nine other States, and the validity of
the taxes imposed on each taxpayer would depend on the par-
ticular other States in which it operated."' Thus, for exam-
ple, the Court must determine whether the Oklahoma tax, if
applied by every other state, would subject the interstate bus
travel to multiple taxation. When considering the constitutional-
ity of the apportionment of a tax, the analysis is not complete
without a corresponding evaluation of external consistency.
2. External Consistency
Although internally consistent, a taxation formula may still
unfairly burden taxpayers. The external consistency test consid-
ers the economic justification for the state's claim to the value
taxed. °7 The Court asks whether the state has taxed only
that portion of the revenues from the interstate activity which
reasonably reflects the in-state component of the activity being
taxed.' It requires that "the [factors] used in the apportion-
ment formula must actually reflect a reasonable sense of how
income is generated.""9
While the internal consistency test is relatively straightfor-
ward in its application, the external consistency test can pose
difficulties depending on the facts of each case. The Court must
"examine the in-state business activity which triggers the tax-
able event and the practical or economic effect of the tax on
that interstate activity.""' This is essentially a practical in-
quiry and it is exactly this practical inquiry which the Court
105. Id.
106. Armco v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 638-39 (1984). The Court invalidated a
West Virginia business and occupation tax measured by the gross receipts of the
business. The tax was imposed on businesses for the privilege of doing business with-
in the state.
107. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1338.
108. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262 (1989); Container Corp. of Am. v. Fran-
chise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983).
109. Container Corp. of Am., 463 U.S. at 169.
110. Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262.
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avoids in Oklahoma Tax Commission by labelling the tax a
sales tax on the discrete sale of a service."'
B. Facts and Procedural History
Jefferson Lines is a Minnesota corporation that provides bus
transportation service for both interstate and intrastate travel
in the state of Oklahoma." Jefferson Lines filed for bank-
ruptcy under Chapter 11 in 1989."' Oklahoma state law im-
poses a tax of 4.5% on the gross receipts from the sale of sever-
al taxable events, including transportation for hire to persons
by common carriers." This law requires Jefferson Lines to
collect and remit a tax measured by the gross sales price of
every bus ticket sold in Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Tax Commis-
sion sought payment from Jefferson Lines for unpaid sales
taxes on the gross price of interstate bus tickets sold in Oklaho-
ma."' The Commission argued that the sale of a bus ticket is
a purely local transaction justifying a sales tax on the ticket's
value in the state where it is sold."'
111. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1344.
112. Id. at 1335.
113. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d 90, 91 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331 (1995).
114. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 1354 (Supp. 1996). The statute provides in pertinent
part:
(1) There is hereby levied upon all sales, not otherwise exempted in
Oklahoma Sales Tax Code, Section 1350 et seq. of this title, an excise
tax of four and one-half percent (4.5%) of the gross receipts or gross
proceeds of each sale of the following:
(C) Transportation for hire to persons by common carriers, including
railroads both steam and electric, motor transportation companies,
taxicab companies, pullman car companies, airlines, and other means
of transportation for hire.
"Oklahoma is the only state to tax interstate transportation, a step other states have
avoided, apparently because they regarded the practice as unconstitutional under
[Central Greyhound]." High Court Says States Can Tax Travel Tickets, STAR-TRIB.
Mpls.-St.Paul, Apr. 4, 1995, available in 1995 WL 3658295 [hereinafter High Court].
115. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d at 91.
116. Id. at 92. The Commission explained "that the Oklahoma sales tax is based
solely on the purchase price of the ticket, and that once the sale has occurred, the
taxable event is complete." Id. at 92. However, the court of appeals rejected this
argument because it taxed only the purchase of the ticket while ignoring the fact
that the value of the ticket is derived from the use of it for transportation.
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Jefferson had collected and remitted taxes for all intrastate
bus tickets sold in Oklahoma,"7 but argued that the tax on
its sales of interstate bus tickets imposed an undue burden on
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause"' by
permitting Oklahoma to collect a percentage of the full pur-
chase price of all tickets sold for interstate bus travel, even
though some of that value is derived from travel through other
states."9 The bankruptcy court agreed with Jefferson, and
both the district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed. 2 ' The bankruptcy court and the district court ap-
plied the four part test of Complete Auto and found that the
statute was not fairly apportioned.'2' The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals also found that the statute was not fairly
apportioned under its own Complete Auto analysis.
C. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision
The court of appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Central Greyhound in finding that the tax violated the Com-
merce Clause.'22 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held
this tax to be indistinguishable from the unapportioned tax on
gross receipts'23 from interstate bus travel struck down in
Central Greyhound.'24 The court of appeals found the Oklaho-
ma tax indistinguishable in terms of substantive effect from the
New York tax held unconstitutional in 1948." It further held
117. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1135 (1995).
118. U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regu-
late Commerce . . . among the several states . .. ."
119. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1335.
120. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d at 91. The court of appeals refused to
"separate the sale of a piece of paper from the service which it represents. To hold
otherwise would elevate form over substance." The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
retreated from the semantics of the Spector rule by focusing more on the economic
realities of the tax instead of its draftsmanship. Id. at 92.
121. Id. at 91.
122. Id. at 92.
123. The Supreme Court acknowledged that it follows standard usage under which
gross receipts taxes are on the gross receipts from sales payable by the seller, in
contrast to sales taxes which are also levied on the gross receipts from sales but are
payable by the buyer (although they are collected by the seller and remitted to the
taxing entity). Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335
n.3 (1995).
124. Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
125. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d at 92-93.
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that the Oklahoma tax failed the apportionment prong of the
Complete Auto test because it was not externally consistent.
Little discussion is necessary to determine that the sale of
the bus ticket in Okahoma and the intrastate bus transporta-
tion established Jefferson Line's sufficient nexus to Oklahoma,
meeting the first prong of the Complete Auto test.' In consid-
ering apportionment, the second prong of the Complete Auto
test, the Eighth Circuit found that the tax reached the entire
amount of gross receipts from the sale of transportation outside
its borders as well as receipts from the sale of transportation
within its borders." 8 Thus, the tax does not reasonably reflect
the in-state portion of the interstate activity being taxed, espe-
cially where the Supreme Court has held in the past that
apportionment for bus travel is administratively feasible. 9
The court of appeals, citing Goldberg v. Sweet with approval,
found that apportionment of the tax on the basis of miles trav-
elled within a state is both administratively and technologically
feasible. 3 '
The court of appeals acknowledged that, in evaluating the
tax, it must look beyond formalism and consider the practical
and economic effect of the tax on interstate commerce.' The
Oklahoma Tax Commission argued that the tax is externally
consistent and does not need to be apportioned because the tax
is on the sale of the ticket and is imposed only on the discrete
local sales event. 3 ' In essence, the Commission proffered a
formalistic argument, contending that only the actual purchase
of a ticket is taxed and not the use of the ticket.'33 This argu-
ment fails most notably to consider the substance of the sale of
an interstate bus ticket, which is the interstate transportation
of passengers for hire. The court of appeals did not embrace the
Commission's proffered formalistic distinction and refused to
126. Id.
127. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
128. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d at 92.
129. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948); see also
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989) (distinguishing apportionment of telecommu-
nications from the apportionment of large physical objects over identifiable routes).
130. In re Jefferson Lines, Inc., 15 F.3d at 93.
131. Id. at 92.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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separate the sale of a piece of paper from the service which it
represents."4 Like the New York tax held unconstitutional in
Central Greyhound, the court found that the Oklahoma tax is a
direct burden on interstate commerce and the amount of the
burden bears no relationship to the portion of the trip that oc-
curs within the taxing state.135 In reaching its decision, the
court of appeals found it unnecessary to consider the remaining
two prongs of the Complete Auto test because it concluded, as
did the lower courts, that the tax was not fairly apportioned
within the test of Complete Auto.
136
D. The Supreme Court's Majority Decision37
In reversing the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice
Souter also applied the four-prong test of Complete Auto, 3'
but found that Oklahoma's tax on the full price of a ticket for
bus travel from Oklahoma to another state is consistent with
the Commerce Clause."9 Under the Complete Auto test, a tax
will be sustained against a Commerce Clause challenge when
"the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus to
the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the servic-
es provided by the State."40
As to the first prong of the test, the Court easily found, and
Jefferson did not deny, Oklahoma's substantial nexus to the in-
state portion of the bus service.' The majority seems content
134. Id.
135. Id. at 93.
136. Id. The remaining two prongs of the Complete Auto test include a consider-
ation of whether 1) the tax discriminates against interstate commerce and 2) the tax
is fairly related to the services or benefits provided by the State. Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
137. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion, and Justice Scalia filed a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Scalia
refused to join Part II of Justice Souter's opinion applying the "four-part test" of
Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
138. The four-part test of Complete Auto has been applied and refined in several
other Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989) (tax on
interstate telephone calls); D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988) (use
tax); Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (franchise tax).
139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
140. Complete Auto Transit Co. Inc., 430 U.S. 279. See supra part II.B.
141. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1338 (1995).
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to classify the sale of the ticket as the discrete sale of a taxable
good instead of the sale of a service. "The completion of a sale
of a service happens when the service is completed, whereas
completion of a sale of goods happens when the goods are de-
livered.""" It is well settled "that a sale of tangible goods has
a sufficient nexus to the state in which the sale is consummat-
ed to be treated as a local transaction taxable by that
state."" Jefferson argued, however, that the sale of the ticket
is not merely the sale of a good. Jefferson contended that the
sale of the bus ticket represented the sale of a right to service
and that Oklahoma was only justified in taxing the portion of
the service that took place within its borders.'" This argu-
ment more appropriately applies to the issue of apportionment.
Justice Souter then approached the more difficult second
prong of apportionment. The majority found the tax internally
consistent,'45  notwithstanding the economic reality of the
tax,' because the sale of a ticket is a discrete event subject
to taxation in only one state.'47 Justice Souter concluded that
sales of services with at least partial performance in the taxing
state justify a state tax on the entire gross receipts.' Justice
Souter distinguished the Court's holding in Central Greyhound
by noting the identity of the taxpayer burdened by the relevant
tax.4 The tax at issue in Central Greyhound was imposed on
the gross receipts of the seller corporation, while the Oklahoma
tax was imposed on the buyer of each ticket as a percentage of
the sales price. 5 ' Such taxes were collected by Jefferson and
remitted to Oklahoma. Justice Souter reasoned that since the
tax was on the discrete sales event in Oklahoma and some of
the services were delivered in Oklahoma, no other state could
claim to be the site of the same combination and thus the sale
would not be subject to multiple taxation.'5' Justice Souter
142. Wagner, supra note 96, at 299.
143. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1338 (citing McGoldrick v. Berwind-
Wind Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940)).
144. Id. at 1335.
145. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
146. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1338.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1340.
149. Id. at 1340-41.
150. Id. at 1340.
151. Id. at 1341.
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explained that Jefferson had not given a set of facts that would
subject either the corporation or its passengers to multiple tax-
ation from either a successive sales tax or a discriminatory use
tax.'5 ' The majority further rejected Jefferson's position favor-
ing apportionment based on mileage and distinguished Goldberg
stating that a particular apportionment formula need not be
used simply because it is possible to use it.' 5 ' Thus, the ma-
jority concluded that the Oklahoma tax is internally consistent.
Justice Souter began his discussion of external consistency by
recalling the historical treatment of taxes classified as a sales
tax.M He stated that interstate activity may be essential to a
substantial portion of the value of the services, as in the sale of
advertising and interstate circulation of the journal in Western
Live Stock.'55 Further, the interstate component may be essen-
tial to performance of the services as in the instant case. 5'
Justice Souter stated however, that sales with at least a partial
performance in the taxing state justify that state's taxation of
the transaction's entire gross receipts. by the seller."' Jeffer-
son argued that the sale of the services did not occur until de-
livery was made; that delivery is made by services provided
over time and through space; and that a separate sale occurs at
each moment of delivery or when each state's segment of trans-
portation is completed. 8 The Court responded by saying that
the sale was completed at the time of the combined events of
payment for a ticket and its delivery for present commencement
of the trip.' 9 Thus, the majority concluded that the tax was
externally consistent because it reaches only the activity taking
place within Oklahoma. 6 °
As to the third prong of the Complete Auto test, Justice
Souter maintained that since only Oklahoma can tax the sale of
transportation originating in Oklahoma and since it imposes the
tax equally on both interstate and intrastate bus travel, the tax
152. Id. at 1342-43.
153. Id. at 1343.
154. Id. at 1338.
155. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
156. See also Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
157. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1340.
158. Id. at 1341.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1344.
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does not discriminate against interstate commerce.' 6' The final
prong of the Complete Auto test requires a fair relation between
the tax and the benefits conferred upon the taxpayer by the
state. Justice Souter rejected Jefferson's argument that the only
benefits to the purchaser from the taxing state occur during the
portion of the travel that occurs in Oklahoma.'62 Justice
Souter explained that the state provides benefits and services,
such as police and fire protection as well as access to Oklahoma
courts, while the taxpayer is selling tickets inside Oklaho-
ma.6' In return, the state exacts a tax measured by the gross
receipts of ticket sales.' In this way, interstate commerce is
made to pay its fair share of state expenses by contributing to
the costs of providing governmental services, including ones
from which the taxpayer receives no direct benefit.'65
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, remained
consistent with his opinion in Goldberg. He concurred in the
judgment, reasoning that the Oklahoma tax is valid because it
does not facially discriminate against interstate commerce. 66
He went on to comment that the four-part test of Complete
Auto should be discarded and "immunization of interstate com-
merce" from discriminatory state action should be left to Con-
gress.
67
E. The Dissent
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O'Connor joined, was
unconvinced that this tax was distinguishable from the New
161. Id. at 1346. But see American Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266
(1987). The Court in Scheiner held that a flat tax on trucks for the privilege of using
Pennsylvania's roads discriminated upon interstate travel by imposing a cost per mile
on out-of-state trucks far exceeding the cost per mile borne by locally owned trucks.
Justice Souter distinguished the tax in Scheiner because the tax in Oklahoma was
based upon the purchase of the ticket and not upon the use of the State's roads.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1345.
162. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1345.
163. Id. at 1346.
164. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1346.
165. Id. at 1346 (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 267 (1989)).
166. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
167. Id. Justice Scalia reasoned that the four-part test of Complete Auto espoused
by the majority contained "imponderables," which he believes the Court should not
undertake to decide. Id.
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York tax held unconstitutional in Central Greyhound Lines, Inc.
v. Mealey.161 Justice Breyer argued that this tax is a not
merely a tax on an object involved in interstate commerce.
"Rather, it is a tax imposed upon interstate travel itself-the
very essence of interstate commerce. " '69 The crux of his argu-
ment is that there are only minor differences between the Okla-
homa tax at issue and the New York tax found to offend the
Commerce Clause.
70
Justice Breyer made a compelling argument on the similari-
ties between the statute at issue in Oklahoma and the New
York tax statute held to violate the Commerce Clause in Cen-
tral Greyhound. The language in both statutes is similar and
the practical result of both is to tax gross receipts as measured
by sales.17 ' Justice Breyer argued that the majority, in charac-
terizing the taxable event as a sale, ignored the economic reali-
ty of the transaction in favor of a more formalistic ap-
proach.72  Justice Breyer noted further that the Goldberg
Court carefully distinguished apportionment cases "where it [is]
practicable to keep track of the distance actually travelled with-
in the taxing State."73 Justice Breyer concluded by reaffirm-
ing the principles of Central Greyhound "even if doing so re-
quires different treatment for the inherently interstate service
of interstate transportation, and denies the possibility of having
a single, formal constitutional rule for all self-described 'sales
taxes.""'74 This suggestion is not without merit considering the
ever-changing tax laws of both the individual States and the
federal government.
168. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
169. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1349. "[I]t is a fairly obvious effort to
tax more than 'that portion' of the 'interstate activity['s]' revenue 'which reasonably
reflects the in-state component.'" Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262
(1989)).
170. Id. at 1347-48.
171. Id. at 1347-48; see OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 1354(1)(C) (Supp. 1995) (an
"excise tax" of 4.5% on "the gross receipts or gross proceeds of each sale" made in
Oklahoma); N.Y. TAX LAW § 186-a (Consol. 1994) (a 3 1/2% tax on the "receipts re-
ceived . . .of any sale" in New York).
172. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1348.
173. Id. at 1349 (citing Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 264). Justice Marshall noted several
previous Supreme Court cases where the Court endorsed apportionment formulas for
trucks, cargo containers, motor carriers, oil pipelines, and buses. See id. at 264 n.14.
174. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1349 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYZING OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION
A. Improper Characterization as a Sales Tax
The majority gives an extended history of dormant Commerce
Clause adjudication which is beyond the scope of this casenote,
but the present state of the law is the four-part test of Com-
plete Auto handed down by the Court in 1977.'7 Complete Au-
to expressly overruled the form over substance approach of
Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor76 where the Court cate-
gorically abandoned this latter-day formalism. However, by
ignoring the economic reality of the Oklahoma tax and placing
great weight on the characterization of the tax as a sales tax,
the Court appears to revert to its pre-1977 formalistic approach.
The majority attempts to distinguish the tax in Central Grey-
hound from the Oklahoma tax by "characteriz[ing] the former
as a 'gross receipts tax' and the latter as a constitutionally
distinguishable 'sales tax.'"" Justice Breyer points out that
the difference is one of form rather than substance because Jef-
ferson Lines is still responsible for submitting the same amount
of tax to the state regardless of the label or the identity of the
original burdened taxpayer.'78 As the court stated in Complete
Auto, "[tihe reason for attaching constitutional significance to a
semantic difference is difficult to discern."' This formalistic
approach which ignores the economic substance of a transaction
runs afoul of the Court's decision in Complete Auto and opens
the door for further state taxes on interstate transportation. In-
deed, beyond transportation services, this decision could en-
courage state governments to explore ways to tax professional
175. See supra part II.B.
176. Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); see supra part II.A.3.
177. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. at 1348 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
the majority).
178. Id.
179. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 285 (expressly overruling Spector Motor
Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951)). The Court previously relied on the state
label to determine the constitutionality of a state tax. Spector distinguished between
a tax on the privilege of doing business in a state measured by income derived from
interstate commerce and a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce.
The Spector Court relied more on draftsmanship than the economic substance of the
tax and was overruled by Complete Auto.
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services such as advertising, accounting, and legal representa-
tion 8 ° as well as sales taxes on interstate rail and airline
travel.' Presently, Oklahoma is the only state to tax inter-
state transportation.
82
B. No Reliance on Established Precedent
The lower courts relied, as did the dissent, on the Court's
decision in Central Greyhound which is very similar to the
instant case.'8 ' The majority fails to indicate that the holding
in Central Greyhound is no longer good law, yet it dismisses
the similarities through an unconvincing distinction between
the identities of the taxpayers burdened by the taxing
scheme.' On the other hand, Justice Breyer pointed out the
similarities in the wording of the statutes, the activities in
question, and most importantly, the practical effect of the tax
on interstate commerce.' 8 ' The majority is content to ignore
both precedent and practical effect to reach its decision in Okla-
homa Tax Commission. Because of its respect for precedent and
a practical consideration of the tax's substantive effect, the
dissent seems to be the better reasoned opinion.
C. Effects on Interstate Commerce
Justice Breyer correctly points out, and the majority seems to
believe, that the activity Oklahoma intends to tax is the trans-
portation of passengers for hire, not the privilege of selling
tickets in Oklahoma.'8 ' Aside from the risks of multiple taxa-
tion discussed below," ' the results of this tax discriminate
against interstate activity by exacting more than their constitu-
tionally fair share of the receipts which will subject the taxpay-
er to multiple taxation. 8 ' Justice Frankfurter would agree
180. Paul M. Barrett, Supreme Court Allows State Tax on Interstate Bus Trans-
portation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1995, at B7.
181. High Court, supra note 114.
182. Id.
183. Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
184. See supra notes 51-67 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
186. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1348 (1995).
187. See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
188. The ticket price is a function of the mileage travelled, and the tax is a per-
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that other states could hardly be denied the right to tax the
portion of the gross receipts representing the portion of the bus
travel which occurs in their state where they provide protection
and benefits to the bus corporation.'89 Because state roads
and highways will be burdened by this interstate transportation
without a corresponding charge for the benefits conferred, it can
be argued that the Oklahoma tax creates an undue burden on
interstate commerce. This burden on the neighboring states
could only be remedied by subjecting the taxpayer to multiple
taxation by the burdened state.
D. Risk of Multiple Taxation
The Oklahoma tax does not contain a credit provision like
the Illinois tax upheld in Goldberg,9 ' and thus the Oklahoma
tax is an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce be-
cause it subjects the taxpayer to the risk of multiple taxa-
tion. 9' Addressing a tax similar to the credit provision in
Goldberg, the Supreme Court in D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara
held that Louisiana's use tax on a retailer's customers is fairly
apportioned if the state "provides a credit against its use tax
for sales taxes that have been paid in other states."'92 Jeffer-
son correctly argued that there is a risk of multiple taxation be-
cause any other state through which a bus travels may impose
centage of the ticket price. Thus, the greater the distance travelled, the higher the
price of the ticket, as well as the tax paid. It seems that if interstate tickets cover
greater mileage, and therefore cost more and have a higher tax, taxpayers pay more
for services which they use less. The converse is true for local intrastate transporta-
tion. The majority avoids a consideration of the fair relation prong of the Complete
Auto test, stating that a detailed accounting of the services and benefits rendered is
unnecessary. See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 267 (1989).
189. Central Greyhound v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 662 (1948) (1948) ("If New Jersey
and Pennsylvania could claim their right to make appropriately apportioned claims
against that substantial part of the business of appellant to which they afford protec-
tion, we do not see how on principle and in precedent such a claim could be denied.")
Suppose 25% of all interstate bus transportation originating in Oklahoma travelled in
the state of Texas. While travelling in Texas, Oklahoma provides police and fire pro-
tection, as well as access to the courts and maintenance of the very roads upon
which bus travel depends. Following the holding in Central Greyhound, Texas would
be allowed to tax the 25% of the gross receipts which represents the cost of the ser-
vices it provides to the bus corporation.
190. Goldberg, 488 U.S. 252 (1989).
191. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 546 (1938).
192. D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988).
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a tax on the bus company for the use of its roads. 9' Professor
Hellerstein, a noted authority on Commerce Clause adjudication
concerning state taxation, argues that "the grant of a credit
does not make the tax fairly apportioned and ... credits are no
more than a second-best alternative, compelled by administra-
tive considerations, to the fair apportionment of a tax base."'94
In the instant case, the Oklahoma tax is devoid of a credit
provision required by the Court in Illinois and Louisiana. 9'
Further, the Court recognized and demonstrated that apportion-
ment on the basis of mileage is administratively and technologi-
cally feasible.' 9 ' However, because the Court cannot predict all
the ways that states may attempt to tax such interstate trans-
portation, it is compelled to inquire into the practical effects of
the tax and avoid formalistic labelling. It is exactly this practi-
cal inquiry which the majority and Justices Scalia and Thomas
have refused to conduct.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commerce Clause is the manifestation of the framer's
intent to avoid the economic balkanization of the states. In
Complete Auto, the Court set forth the current test to deter-
mine if a state tax conflicts with our framer's lofty goals. The
Complete Auto decision not only pronounced a workable test,
but also marked a shift by the Court to examine the practical
effects of a state tax which burdens interstate commerce.
While Justices Scalia and Thomas would only hold a facially
discriminatory statute unconstitutional, the remainder of the
Court is content to apply the Complete Auto test to the Oklaho-
ma tax. The majority retreated somewhat from the Court's shift
in Complete Auto by mischaracterizing the tax as a sales tax
while ignoring its substantive effects. The dissent and the lower
courts seem to have correctly applied the Court's decision in
Central Greyhound, and the majority is remiss in avoiding
193. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1335 (1995).
194. Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Foolish?: Reflections on an Emerg-
ing Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 138, 186 (1988).
195. OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 1361(A) (Supp. 1995).
196. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1343; see, e.g., Central Greyhound Lines,
Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
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Central Greyhound's precedential value through a formalistic
distinction. While apportionment may make our taxation system
even more complicated, that is a matter for legislative grace
and should not deter the Court from examining the economic
reality of a tax.
Jason P. Livingston

